Privacy settings
Bitcoin Roots gives node operators control over network routing, transaction broadcasting, and wallet coin selection. These controls protect different things: Tor and I2P can hide your IP address from Bitcoin peers; wallet choices can reduce some links between your coins. Transactions and their amounts remain public on the blockchain.
This guide describes v31.1-roots.2, checked on 21 October 2026. Defaults below assume a fresh configuration and wallet. Existing configuration, GUI settings, wallet flags, and command-line arguments can change them. Check your executable with bitcoin-cli --version and its built-in help.
For the current v32.1 source, consult the feature catalogue and wallet manual. The versioned defaults in this guide remain a v31.1-roots.2 snapshot. In v32.1, key-disclosure RPCs require the explicit startup --allow-dangerous-rpc opt-in; configuration files and persistent settings cannot enable them. See Wallet privacy tools for that boundary.
Defaults at a glance
| Feature or setting | Default | How to enable or use it |
|---|---|---|
| Private transaction broadcasting | Off (privatebroadcast=0) | Set privatebroadcast=1 and configure Tor or I2P. Applies to sendrawtransaction, not wallet sends. |
| Tor proxy for outbound connections | No explicit proxy | Set onion=127.0.0.1:9050 for onion peers, or proxy=127.0.0.1:9050 for general proxy routing. Control-port discovery is also supported. |
| Automatic Tor onion service | On (listenonion=1), subject to listening configuration | Requires a reachable, authenticated Tor control endpoint; normally 127.0.0.1:9051. |
| Tor stream isolation | On (proxyrandomize=1) for configured proxy connections | Keep it enabled; Tor must support SOCKS authentication isolation. |
| I2P routing | Off; no SAM endpoint configured | Set i2psam=127.0.0.1:7656 and enable the router's SAM bridge. |
| Inbound I2P connections | On (i2pacceptincoming=1) when SAM is configured, subject to listening settings | Set i2pacceptincoming=0 for outbound-only I2P. |
| Encrypted P2P transport (BIP324) | On (v2transport=1) | Used with compatible peers; older peers can use v1. |
| Address-reuse avoidance | Off for newly created wallets (avoid_reuse=false) | Enable the per-wallet avoid_reuse flag. |
| Forced partial-spend avoidance | Off (avoidpartialspends=0) | Set avoidpartialspends=1; also enabled for wallets with avoid_reuse. |
| Extra fee budget for partial-spend avoidance | Zero (maxapsfee=0) | Grouping can still be chosen without an additional fee. Set a reviewed budget in BTC if desired. |
| Automatic wallet broadcasting | On (walletbroadcast=1) | Set walletbroadcast=0 for an explicit external/manual submission workflow. |
| Bloom-filter service for peers (BIP37) | Off (peerbloomfilters=0) | Usually leave off. This setting controls what your node serves to peers. |
| Local address discovery | Normally on when listening without externalip or proxy | Set discover=0 to disable discovery of your own addresses. |
| DNS peer discovery | Normally on (dnsseed=1) when low on peer addresses | Set dnsseed=0 to disable DNS seeding; arrange another way to find peers. |
Configuration examples below belong in bitcoin.conf, one setting per line. Restart Roots after editing startup settings. Wallet RPC changes are made while the node is running and apply to the selected wallet.
Tor: explicit setup or automatic discovery
Having Tor running on its SOCKS port 9050 alone does not guarantee discovery. Choose one of these approaches.
Explicit onion proxy
For private broadcasts and connections to onion peers through a local Tor daemon:
onion=127.0.0.1:9050
privatebroadcast=1
proxyrandomize=12
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onion only configures routing for onion peers. Regular IPv4/IPv6 peer connections and DNS lookups can still use your ordinary network connection. Tor Browser commonly uses port 9150 instead; use the endpoint actually running on your machine.
Automatic discovery through Tor control
With listenonion=1 and compatible listening settings, Roots attempts to connect to Tor's control endpoint, defaulting to 127.0.0.1:9051. Tor must have its control port enabled, and Roots must be able to authenticate using the Tor cookie or a configured torpassword.
After successful authentication, Roots asks Tor for its SOCKS listeners and configures the onion proxy when onion is unset. It also creates an onion service for incoming connections. This is control-port discovery, not a scan for a SOCKS proxy. See the Tor setup guide for authentication and service configuration.
Route regular outbound peers through Tor
For an example that restricts automatic outbound peer selection to onion peers:
proxy=127.0.0.1:9050
onlynet=onion
privatebroadcast=1
proxyrandomize=1
listen=0
discover=0
dnsseed=02
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proxy supplies SOCKS routing, and onlynet restricts automatic outbound connections. onlynet does not restrict incoming connections or necessarily explicitly configured peers; review addnode, connect, and seednode too. Here listen=0 disables incoming connections, including automatic onion-service creation. dnsseed=0 disables DNS seeding, so a fresh node needs another source of onion peer addresses. Review the Tor guide before adopting this profile.
Keep stream isolation enabled. It uses randomized SOCKS credentials to help separate Tor streams, subject to Tor's isolation configuration. It does not guarantee protection against timing correlation.
I2P: configure the SAM bridge explicitly
Roots does not automatically discover a running I2P router. Enable its SAM bridge and specify the endpoint, usually:
i2psam=127.0.0.1:7656
privatebroadcast=12
This permits I2P alongside other configured networks. Add onlynet=i2p to restrict automatic outbound peers to I2P; that setting has the same explicit-peer and inbound limitations described above. Set i2pacceptincoming=0 if you only want outbound I2P connections. See the I2P setup guide for router and SAM configuration.
If both Tor and I2P are configured and available, private broadcasting can use either. It randomly selects among eligible networks for each new private broadcast connection. After successful outbound Tor connectivity, eligible IPv4/IPv6 destinations may also be reached through the Tor proxy. This is not direct clearnet fallback.
Private transaction broadcasting
With privatebroadcast=1, transactions submitted through sendrawtransaction are sent over short-lived private broadcast connections without first entering your node's mempool. This reduces the association between a transaction and your node's usual peer connections.
It cannot undo exposure from a transaction you already shared through ordinary broadcasting or another service.
bitcoin-cli sendrawtransaction "SIGNED_TRANSACTION_HEX"
bitcoin-cli getprivatebroadcastinfo2
The first command submits a real transaction. Use it only after reviewing a fully signed transaction. The second reports pending private broadcasts. abortprivatebroadcast "TXID_OR_WTXID" removes a transaction from the pending queue; it cannot recall copies already sent to peers.
The RPC rejects submission if private broadcasting is enabled but neither network is configured as reachable. A stopped proxy, unavailable peers, or network disruption can still prevent delivery. Queueing is not confirmation.
Transactions sent through the built-in wallet are not affected by privatebroadcast. It is also incompatible with connect, because it needs to open new connections to randomly selected peers.
Separate wallet preparation from submission
walletbroadcast=0 disables automatic wallet transaction broadcasting. It does not itself enable private broadcasting or make ordinary wallet sends private. For a deliberate manual workflow, prepare and sign a PSBT, review it, finalize it, and submit its signed hex with sendrawtransaction on the node configured for private broadcasting. Consult the wallet RPC help for the specific workflow. Explicit submission RPCs still broadcast when requested.
Wallet privacy and coin selection
Avoid address reuse
Use a fresh receiving address for each payment. The wallet's avoid_reuse flag additionally tracks address reuse and changes coin selection to avoid reused outputs where applicable. It does not erase address history or undo links already visible on the blockchain.
Enable it for an existing wallet, replacing WALLET_NAME:
bitcoin-cli -rpcwallet=WALLET_NAME setwalletflag avoid_reuse true
bitcoin-cli -rpcwallet=WALLET_NAME getwalletinfo2
Review the RPC's warning: enabling this on an existing wallet requires a blockchain rescan to correctly mark previously used destinations. Plan that rescan separately, especially on a pruned node where historical blocks may be unavailable. avoid_reuse is a persistent per-wallet flag, not a bitcoin.conf setting. For a new wallet, createwallet accepts avoid_reuse=true.
Avoid partial spends
avoidpartialspends=1This groups outputs by address, selecting many (possibly all) or none rather than spending them piecemeal across transactions. It can reduce repeated address linkage but may increase input count and fees. Wallets with avoid_reuse enable this behavior as well.
Even with forced grouping off, maxapsfee=0 permits the wallet to prefer a grouped alternative when it costs no more. maxapsfee is an additional absolute fee in BTC, not a fee rate; raising it trades fees for grouping. Review coin control before combining outputs from different identities or sources: combining inputs can reveal their common ownership.
Inspect inputs before signing
The wallet privacy tools expose address reuse, grouping, selected inputs, fees, change, and RBF state. Coin control is a manual workflow, not a background anonymity service. Private-key sweeping is also an explicit workflow, with a signed, non-broadcast preview by default; sweeping multiple inputs can link them on-chain.
Other protections and their limits
- Encrypted P2P transport:
v2transport=1is on by default. BIP324 encrypts traffic with compatible peers to reduce passive inspection. It does not hide your IP from the peer or authenticate the peer's identity, and v1 connections remain possible. - DNS and discovery:
discover=0stops local address discovery; it does not hide your IP from a directly connected peer.dnsseed=0disables DNS seeding, not every possible DNS lookup. Explicit hostnames and other settings still matter. An onion-only proxy is not a DNS proxy. - Bloom filters:
peerbloomfilters=0is the default. Enabling this makes your node serve BIP37 filters to clients; it does not make your own wallet private. A wallet using your own full node avoids sending its address queries to a third-party wallet server.
Check your running node
bitcoin-cli --version
bitcoin-cli getnetworkinfo
bitcoin-cli getpeerinfo
bitcoin-cli getprivatebroadcastinfo
bitcoin-cli -rpcwallet=WALLET_NAME getwalletinfo2
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Inspect networks and proxy in getnetworkinfo; inspect peer network, connection_type, and transport_protocol_type in getpeerinfo. getwalletinfo reports the selected wallet's avoid_reuse flag. These are useful observations, not a complete privacy audit. Use bitcoin-cli help COMMAND for each RPC's contract. Do not publish raw diagnostic output containing peer addresses or wallet details.
Versioned references
Defaults and behavior above were checked against the released source:
- Node option help and setup
- Network defaults and private broadcast selection and connection implementation
- Tor control discovery
- Private broadcast RPCs
- Wallet options, wallet defaults, and wallet flags
These settings do not provide an anonymity guarantee, remove public transaction history, or add CoinJoin or payjoin. Choose controls for the information you want to protect, and verify the configuration of the node and wallet you actually use.