v29.4-roots.4 · Commit 29: [PATCH 29/37] docs(release): prepare v29.4-roots.3 candidate notes
doc/wallet-privacy.md
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doc/wallet-privacy.md
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# Advanced wallet privacy tools (unreleased)
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This guide describes the advanced wallet tools in this unreleased
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post-`v29.4-roots.2` topic. They are not part of the published
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`v29.4-roots.2` release. Bitcoin Core v29.4 remains the direct upstream base;
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selected Bitcoin Knots history is lineage only, not an upstream dependency or
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product specification.
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## Sweep an external private key
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retain an independent, secure backup until the sweep confirms.
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The Qt **Sweep Private Key** dialog applies the same contract. Its key field is
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masked and disables copy, cut, and context-menu actions. It clears the entered
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key after a preview request, when dismissed, or when the wallet unloads.
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Showing the key still exposes it on screen; use that control only when the
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display is safe. Broadcasting is irreversible and may fail after a chain or fee
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change.
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## Inspect and select wallet inputs
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- A **Reused address** indicator and grouping describe observable wallet facts.
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Selecting a group combines its inputs and can reveal an on-chain relationship;
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neither label is a privacy recommendation or score.
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- Explicit input selections are honored for the prepared send. Locked, unsafe,
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immature, or unavailable inputs are reported by the wallet. A material wallet
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change, including a competing spend or reorganization, clears the selection
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so the operator must review current inputs again.
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- The confirmation shows the effective inputs, fee, change, and whether the
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These tools do not add CoinJoin, payjoin, silent automatic consolidation,
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private-key export, a transaction-history product, or any anonymity guarantee.
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## Verification references
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The reviewed behavior is exercised by
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[`wallet_sweepprivkeys.py`](/test/functional/wallet_sweepprivkeys.py),
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[`wallet_send.py`](/test/functional/wallet_send.py), wallet unit tests, and
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[`src/qt/test/wallettests.cpp`](/src/qt/test/wallettests.cpp). Use
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`bitcoin-cli help sweepprivkeys` and the final transaction preview as the
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authority for a particular binary and transaction.
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# Advanced wallet privacy tools (`v29.4-roots.3` candidate)
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This guide describes the advanced wallet tools intended for the
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`v29.4-roots.3` candidate. This is candidate documentation, not a release
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announcement; the tools are not part of the published `v29.4-roots.2` release.
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Bitcoin Core v29.4 remains the direct upstream base; selected Bitcoin Knots
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history is lineage only, not an upstream dependency or product specification.
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## Sweep an external private key
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retain an independent, secure backup until the sweep confirms.
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The Qt **Sweep Private Key** dialog applies the same contract. Its key field is
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masked and disables copy, cut, and context-menu actions. The dialog uses a
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transient secure key cache, cleans its temporary encoded input, and overwrites
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then clears its input control when it can invalidate a request. A cancellation
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can stop an outstanding scan or preview; once broadcast submission passes its
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final authorization boundary, it cannot be cancelled and the dialog waits for
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the result. These measures reduce the lifetime of the entered secret, but do
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not promise to erase every copy retained by the GUI toolkit or host. Showing
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the key still exposes it on screen; use that control only when the display is
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safe. Broadcasting is irreversible and may fail after a chain or fee change.
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## Inspect and select wallet inputs
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- A **Reused address** indicator and grouping describe observable wallet facts.
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Selecting a group combines its inputs and can reveal an on-chain relationship;
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neither label is a privacy recommendation or score.
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- The dialog starts with the wallet's normal available-output list. Locked
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outputs remain visible so their lock state can be inspected, but cannot be
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selected. Unsafe and immature outputs are not added merely to show a status;
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outputs excluded by those normal availability filters are absent until their
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state changes. “Not spendable” is metadata for a displayed output, not an
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inventory of unavailable outputs.
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- Explicit input selections are honored for the prepared send. A material wallet
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change, including a competing spend or reorganization, clears the selection
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so the operator must review current inputs again.
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- The confirmation shows the effective inputs, fee, change, and whether the
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These tools do not add CoinJoin, payjoin, silent automatic consolidation,
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private-key export, a transaction-history product, or any anonymity guarantee.
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## Candidate verification
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The candidate behavior is exercised by
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[`wallet_sweepprivkeys.py`](/test/functional/wallet_sweepprivkeys.py),
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[`wallet_send.py`](/test/functional/wallet_send.py), wallet unit tests, and
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[`src/qt/test/wallettests.cpp`](/src/qt/test/wallettests.cpp). Before operating
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on funds, compare the intended command with the built binary and inspect a
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non-broadcast preview:
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```sh
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bitcoin-cli help sweepprivkeys
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build/test/functional/test_runner.py wallet_sweepprivkeys.py
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python3 ci/test/test_wallet_privacy_contract.py
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```
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`bitcoin-cli help sweepprivkeys` and the final transaction preview are the
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authority for a particular binary and transaction. Verify the executable's
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identity separately with `bitcoin-cli --version`; the intended
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`v29.4-roots.3` candidate label in this guide does not replace that check.
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