v29.4-roots.3 · Commit 10: [PATCH 10/30] fix: harden final Roots assurance
src/wallet/spend.cpp
Before: src/wallet/spend.cpp · After: src/wallet/spend.cpp
File metadata
index 3292ae27976c7cc7328426b35c5163c00c43160e..665e6c92a5b067eb381ba4a0cfd3a55ef5b2abbf 100644
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Diff rows 1–34 of 34. Line numbers refer to the original before/after files.
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src/wallet/spend.cpp
CHANGED
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@@ -937,6 +937,16 @@ static bool IsCurrentForAntiFeeSniping(interfaces::Chain& chain, const uint256&
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return true;
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}
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/**
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* Set a height-based locktime for new transactions (uses the height of the
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* current chain tip unless we are not synced with the current chain
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@@ -967,15 +977,9 @@ static void DiscourageFeeSniping(CMutableTransaction& tx, FastRandomContext& rng
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// now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about
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// nLockTime that preclude a fix later.
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if (IsCurrentForAntiFeeSniping(chain, block_hash)) {
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tx.nLockTime = block_height;
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-
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// Secondly occasionally randomly pick a nLockTime even further back, so
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// that transactions that are delayed after signing for whatever reason,
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// e.g. high-latency mix networks and some CoinJoin implementations, have
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// better privacy.
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if (rng_fast.randrange(10) == 0) {
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tx.nLockTime = std::max(0, int(tx.nLockTime) - int(rng_fast.randrange(100)));
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}
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} else {
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// If our chain is lagging behind, we can't discourage fee sniping nor help
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// the privacy of high-latency transactions. To avoid leaking a potentially
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return true;
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}
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+
uint32_t GetAntiFeeSnipingLockTime(int block_height, FastRandomContext& rng_fast)
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{
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uint32_t lock_time{static_cast<uint32_t>(block_height)};
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if (rng_fast.randrange(10) == 0) {
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lock_time = std::max(0, int(lock_time) - int(rng_fast.randrange(100)));
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}
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if (lock_time == PARASITE_CAT21_LOCKTIME) --lock_time;
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return lock_time;
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}
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+
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/**
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* Set a height-based locktime for new transactions (uses the height of the
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* current chain tip unless we are not synced with the current chain
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// now we ensure code won't be written that makes assumptions about
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// nLockTime that preclude a fix later.
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if (IsCurrentForAntiFeeSniping(chain, block_hash)) {
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// Occasionally pick a nLockTime further back so delayed transactions do
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// not reveal a unique fingerprint. Avoid values reserved by local policy.
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tx.nLockTime = GetAntiFeeSnipingLockTime(block_height, rng_fast);
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} else {
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// If our chain is lagging behind, we can't discourage fee sniping nor help
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// the privacy of high-latency transactions. To avoid leaking a potentially
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